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Fairness, Responsibility, and Efficiency
in the Bankruptcy Discharge: Are the
Commission's Recommendations
Enough?
Veryl Victoria Miles*
I.

Introduction

The expectant companion to any national study or report
calling for review and recommendations for change to federal law
is a nation-wide critique and commentary of the merits of such a
report. This progression of study and reflection of legal reform
may be arduous at times, but is nevertheless an important part of
the process for a thorough and thoughtful discussion of the
opinions of all interested parties engaged in the debate it will
foster. Accordingly, the following is intended to provide a modest
offering to this process of review.
It is the report of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission' that is the subject of this commentary. Although the report
engages a wide range of issues concerning bankruptcy law and

* Associate Dean of Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, The Columbus School
of Law of The Catholic University of America. The author would like to express her
appreciation of the Dickinson Law Review for providing the opportunity to participate in
their law review symposium, "National Bankruptcy Review Commission Report: A
Commentary on the Proposed Changes." Special thanks also goes to Mr. Matthew R. Moetzinger of the Columbus School of Law, class of 1998, for his research and editorial assistance.
1. The National Bankruptcy Review Commission was created under the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4107 (1994), and was assigned the task
"to investigate and study issues and problems relating to title 11, United States Code"
(commonly known as the "Bankruptcy Code") and to provide "proposals and current
arrangements" to addresses the identified issues and problems. Id. at 4147. The membership
of the commission included: Brady C. Williamson, serving as the Chairman; Judge Robert
E. Ginsberg, serving as the Vice Chairman; Jay Alix; M. Caldwell Butler; Babette A.
Ceccotti; John A. Gose; Jeffery J. Hartley; Judge Edith Jones; and James I. Shepard. The
Commission's report was submitted to Congress on October 20, 1997. See BANKRUPTCY:
THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS, NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT
(Oct. 20, 1997) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT].
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procedure, this paper is limited to the Commission's findings on the
treatment of consumer bankruptcy discharge under the Bankruptcy
Code.2 In fact, the Commission went so far as to describe its study
as providing the "single most concentrated national dialogue on
consumer bankruptcy in history."3
It must be noted that this dialogue on consumer bankruptcy
was contentious at times and resulted in several dissenting reports
filed by and on behalf of the participating commissioners.
Moreover, it appears that the commissioners were very divided on
the recommendations concerning consumer bankruptcy as a whole,
with the votes approving the recommendations reflecting a very
small majority of five to four.' Accordingly, in order to present a
full appreciation of the different views of the commissioners on the
consumer bankruptcy discharge, this paper will include references
to the dissenting views expressed by Judge Edith H. Jones, James
I. Shepard, and John A. Gose where relevant.5 These views are
striking and worth sharing because of the different perspectives
they provide and the concerns that are raised about the Commission Report recommendations. An additional factor that appears
to have had an impact on the consumer discharge portion of the
Commissions Report was a memorandum submitted by Judges
Samuel Bufford and Eugene Wedoff and Professors Margaret

2. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 179-231, 287-90 (reporting Chapter 1
recommendations for consumer bankruptcy).
3. Id. at 78.
4. A Dissenting Report submitted by several commissioners stated:
Largely created by the reporter, the report contains many interpretations and
characterizations which often do not reflect the Commission's work. The report,
for instance, does not reveal that the Commission never voted to endorse any
theory for the increase in consumer bankruptcy filings and, in fac [sic], split five
to four on most consumer recommendations; or that meaningful debate on many
significant issues was very limited or nonexistent-the "Consumer Framework"
was presented as a "take-it-or-leave-it" package, with no opportunity to identify
discrete problems and proposed solutions.
Id. ch. 5, at 2 (containing the Individual Commissioner Views, Dissent from the Process of
Writing the Commission's Report, submitted by John A. Gose, Edith H. Jones, and James I.
Shepard); see also id. at vi, 95 (listing references to the 5 to 4 vote on the consumer
bankruptcy recommendations).
5. Chapter 5 of the Commission Report is comprised of the individual commissioner's
views. Judge Jones and Commissioner Shepard offer the most thorough set of comments and
criticisms of that portion of the report addressing the bankruptcy discharge. See id. ch. 5, at
50-74 (Individual Commissioner Views, Additional Dissent to Recommendations for Reform
of Consumer Bankruptcy Law) [hereinafter Dissenting Commissioners].
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Howard and Jeffrey Morris ("The Bufford Group").6

This

memorandum was prepared at the request of the Commission
Reporter, Professor Elizabeth Warren, and was offered to help
facilitate the Commission's discussion of discharge.7 Several of the
recommendations offered by The Bufford Group parallel the
recommendations of the Commission, although the suggested
changes made by The Bufford Group are far more extensive than
those found in the Commission Report.'
II.

The Commission: Mission and Objectives
The Commission Report immediately begins with a statement

of what has happened in the world of bankruptcy since the

enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978.'

It reminds its

audience that the Code, as enacted, was faithfully premised on the
fundamental principles of its predecessor, the Bankruptcy Act of

1898.1" That is, it was designed to provide "fair treatment of
creditors" in the bankruptcy process and to provide the honest
debtor with a "fresh start" after he or she emerges from the

6. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at appendix G.l.c. (Memorandum, May 30,
1997, To: National Bankruptcy Review Commission, From: Judge Samuel L. Bufford,
Professor Margaret Howard, Professor Jeffrey W. Morris, and Judge Eugene R. Wedoff; Re:
Discharge and Dischargeability in Consumer Bankruptcy) [hereinafter Bufford Group
Memorandum].
7. The introduction of the Bufford Group Memorandum provides:
At the request of Professor Elizabeth Warren, we have reviewed various
materials and discussed among ourselves many of the issues regarding dischargeability of debt in consumer bankruptcies, with the aim of presenting to the
Commission a set of recommendations that can form the basis for discussion of
this topic. After presenting an initial draft of recommendations to the Commission, we prepared the following revised discussion paper, reflecting various ideas
raised at the Commission meeting.
Bufford Group Memorandum, supra note 6, at 1.
8. The Bufford Group studied the "overall structure of dischargeability" including: each
of the eighteen categories of nondischargeable debts under section 523(a), as well as subparagraphs (b), (c), (d), and (e) of section 523; several clarifications to section 727; the
superdischarge of chapter 13 as provided under section 1328(a); and Chapter 13 unsecured
debt eligibility limits under section 109(e). See id.
9. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1011330 (1994)).
10. Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898). According to legislative history, the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978 was a comprehensive revision of bankruptcy law and, yet, reflected the
fundamentals of the bankruptcy law and bankruptcy system designed under the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898. See S. REP. No. 989, at 2 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5788.
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bankruptcy system: a system where the burden of financial calamity
is to be shared'by debtors and creditors fairly and with balance."

However, the Commission noted that, since 1978, the bankruptcy system has become the subject of great concern as it has
experienced an increase in the number of consumer bankruptcies
that is seven times the number in 1978.12 The Commission
reported that bankruptcy "has become a part of the changing world
of consumer credit., 13 Yet, with a very strong economy, with both

low inflation rates and low percentages of unemployment, there is
grave concern about the seemingly ready use of bankruptcy relief
by consumers. 4 Does this phenomenon reflect abuse by a society
of individuals that shows little pause in avoiding their obliga-

tions?15 Is this phenomenon reflective of a more pervasive
problem that requires an in-depth and critical look at the kind of
debt structure Americans have allowed themselves to be drawn

into-that is, the ready availability of consumer credit-whereby
"[n]on-mortgage consumer debt, from all sources, stands at $1.7
trillion?' 16 And so the question that was invariably raised in the

debate about this extraordinary increase in consumer bankruptcy
filings is, "Who is responsible?" The Commission quickly noted
that it must be borne by both creditors and debtors because there
is enough blame to be shared by all.' 7
The Commission Report provided an analysis of the reason for

increased consumer bankruptcy.18 The report indicated that the
increase in consumer bankruptcy filings is not a question of
increasing numbers of debtors in the system trying to take
advantage of it with the purpose to avoid paying their financial

11. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at i.-ii. The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act clearly reflects the basic goal of bankruptcy law:
The overall objectives of [the Reform Act legislation] are to make bankruptcy
procedures more efficient, to balance more equitably the interest of different
creditors, to give greater recognition to the interests of the assets of the debtor's
estate, and to give the debtor a less encumbered "fresh start" after bankruptcy.
S. REP. No. 1106, at 1 (1978), reprinted in COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, app. 3 (Lawrence P.
King ed., 15th ed. 1996).
12. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at ii.
13. Id. at 77.
14. See id. at ii; see also id. at 84.
15. Cf. id. at 82-86.
16. 1d. at ii.
17. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 82.
18. See id. at iv. But see supra note 4 and accompanying text (noting lack of consensus
view among Commission members on causes for recent rise in consumer bankruptcy filings).
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obligations. 9
According to the report, "statistical evidence
suggests that consumers who file for bankruptcy today, as a group,
are experiencing a financial crisis similar to the crisis faced by
families when filing rates were only a fraction of their present
levels."2 The statistics used in the Commission Report showed
that debtors in 1997 had income, assets, and debt ratios similar to
21
the debtors twenty years ago when filings were significantly less.
Therefore, it concluded that the system is not used largely by well
off debtors trying to abuse it. Most of the debtors "come to
bankruptcy courts as they have for many years-seeking
relief from
22
debts they have virtually no hope of repaying.,
The Commission asked the question, "Why are so many
Americans in financial trouble?, 23 It noted the answer is difficult-the problems that lead to bankruptcy vary in terms of the
unanticipated calamities, increased financial burdens, and "the
increase in consumer credit., 24 According to the Report, between
1977 and 1997 this country experienced a seven hundred percent
increase in consumer debt. 25 Thus, based on a variety of sources
of data, the Commission Report concluded that consumer bankruptcy is largely due to high levels of consumer credit indebted26
ness.
The Commission Report described its overall goal to recommend changes to the law that will "improve the integrity, the
accountability and efficiency [of our bankruptcy] system."'2 7 The
system must be fair. Critical to the achievement of fairness of

19. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 82.
20. Id.
21. See id. at 83.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 84.
24. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 84-87.
25. See id. at 84.
26. The Commission Report stated:
A number of factors may influence the decision to file bankruptcy, and changing
attitudes undoubtedly affect a family's decision to seek legal help in the face of
financial distress. As more families amass overwhelming debts, attitudes toward
bankruptcy well may change. A debtor working two jobs to recover from a period
of unemployment and facing a foreclosure may decide that bankruptcy is not as
onerous as the alternatives. But the empirical studies seem to indicate that the
sharp rises in consumer bankruptcy-27% last year alone-may be more a
function of a changing debt picture than of a sudden willingness to take advantage
of the bankruptcy system.
Id. at 87.
27. Id. at i.
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course is balance: that is, balance between the debtor's obtaining
a "fresh start;" the need to pay the debtor's obligations to creditors;
and the need for balance between competing creditors. 2 The
Commission intends for its recommendations to provide a means
of achieving a bankruptcy system that has more incentives for
individuals to avoid bankruptcy; or, in cases where bankruptcy
becomes a necessary form of relief, the system available will enable
debtors to "repay more of their debts to more of these creditors., 29 However, the audience is cautioned that the Commission's mandate from Congress was to leave the basic tenets of the
Code "intact," because of Congress' general satisfaction "with the
basic framework established in the current Bankruptcy Code."3
Accordingly, what the Commission provides are a set of recommendations that do not include any "radical or architectural change[s]"
to existing bankruptcy law and procedure.3 1
III. Discharge, Exceptions to Discharge, and Objections to
Discharge: Are the Commission's Recommendations
Enough?
The Commission's goal to improve "integrity, accountability
and efficiency" in the system and to provide for a system that is
balanced should raise the question whether this can be achieved
without some radical changes or, at the least, a set of bolder
recommendations than the Commission made in its report.3 2 This
is an appropriate question when one considers the importance of
the concept of discharge in bankruptcy and the way that it has
evolved since the enactment of the Code in 1978.
As the Commission looked back on what has happened within
the bankruptcy system during the last twenty years since the
enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, it is also worth noting that the
list of debts excepted from discharge under section 523(a) grew
from nine to eighteen by 1997. 33 This is quite remarkable given

28. See id.
29. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at iii.
30. Id. at iv.
31. Id.
32. It is important to note that in the preface of the Commission Report, comments by
Senator Charles E. Grassley were described reflecting his view that the Commission should
be "bold" and "adventuresome" in its work. See id. at v.
33. This fact was recognized by the Commission:
When the Bankruptcy Code initially was enacted, section 523 contained a
short list of exceptions for certain types of wrongdoing, such as fraud, defalcation,
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the fact that the number of debts excepted from discharge under
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was limited to eight categories of debts
and would only be increased by one with the enactment of the
Bankruptcy Code in 1 9 7 8 .3
What did this remarkable growth in nondischargeable debt

categories signify? What was this growing list of nondischargeable
debts in response to, and how did this growth support the basic
goals and tenets of bankruptcy relief? What did the growing list of
debts indicate in terms of a trend that was being created and the
tone it set? What impact did this have on the integrity, accountability, and efficiency of the bankruptcy system? How did this

increase in the categories of nondischargeable debts support the
notion of fairness and balance in the bankruptcy system?

and intentional torts. The list of exceptions has grown to nearly twenty, in
addition to those exceptions contained in other portions of the United States
Code. Some of these exceptions provide overlapping grounds for dischargeability
and are the result of special interest amendments. While the Commission did not
whittle down the list to its original form, as some commentators have advocated,
the Commission recommends certain specific clarifications and amendments to
enhance fairness to all parties and to alleviate litigation, confusion and nonuniformity.
Id. at 180 (reporting on exceptions to discharge in consumer bankruptcy).
34. As originally enacted, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 included four categories of debts
that were excepted from discharge. These categories were expanded several times, and, by
the 1970s, there were eight categories of debts that were deemed nondischargeable. These
categories of debts were the following: (1) taxes; (2) liabilities for obtaining money or
property through false pretenses or false representations or false written statements regarding
one's financial condition, or liabilities for willful conversion of the property of another; (3)
liabilities that were not scheduled to allow a creditor to make a timely proof of claim; (4)
liabilities based on a debtor's fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation as a
fiduciary; (5) unpaid wages due an employee; (6) wages retained by an employer to secure
an employee's promise of faithful performance of the terms of an employment contract; (7)
alimony, child support or liabilities for the seduction of an unmarried female, or for breach
of promise of marriage, or criminal conversion; and (8) liabilities for willful and malicious
injury to person or property of another other than conversion. See § 17(a), 30 Stat. 544
(1898).
The nondischargeable debts enacted under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1979
included nine exceptions to discharge; the categories were similar to those under the
Bankruptcy Act with some variation. These categories included: (1) taxes; (2) money or
property obtained through false pretenses, false representation or actual fraud, or false
written statements; (3) unscheduled debts that prevented a creditor from filing a timely proof
of claim; (4) debts for fraud, embezzlement, or defalcation by a fiduciary; (5) alimony and
child support; (6) debts for willful and malicious injury to the person or property of another;
(7) noncompensatory fines, penalties, or forfeitures for the benefit of a governmental unit;
and (8) guaranteed student loans. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)
(1978).
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As originally promulgated, the debts excepted from discharge
under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 were primarily limited to debts
that support the moral and societal obligations one owed to society
and to the primary institutions most critical to the welfare of a
healthy society. Some examples were: obligations owed to the state
through the payment of taxes and obligations a debtor owed to
another due to the debtor's dishonesty or wrongful conduct.3 5 In
1903, the categories for nondischargeable debts were expanded to
include alimony and child support.3 6 In order to support the fresh
start doctrine, the exceptions to discharge are to be applied
narrowly and construed in favor of the debtor with the burden of
proof falling on the objecting creditor.3 7
What happened under the Code between 1978 and 1997 was
the expansion of excepted debts that included categories no longer
representative of debts solely characteristic of culpable conduct by
the debtor, necessary for the preservation of the public welfare, or
representative of compelling moral duties a debtor owed to a
particular claimant. Instead, many of these obligations were owed
to special interest groups that found a Congress receptive to their
appeals for exceptions to discharge. These debts were often
justified as being excepted from discharge with less compelling
characterizations of culpable conduct and public policy concerns
than the original categories of nondischargeable debts; or, the debts
were ones that were incurred as a result of culpable conduct

35. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. The basic policy objective behind nondischargeable debts under section 523(a) is aptly described in a contemporary treatise and
reflects the original objectives of the nondischargeable debt under the Bankruptcy Act of
1898:
[T]he two bases of policy upon which exceptions of section 523 of the Code
appear to be founded are: (1) that the debtor should not be relieved of his
financial responsibility to those who have a high moral claim upon him due to
their dependence upon him or their weak bargaining position in relation to him
or perhaps both; and (2) that the relief of discharge is intended for the honest and
thus certain debts created by the debtor's unlawful or oppressive conduct should
remain his obligation.
2 DANIEL R. COWAN, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE, § 6.2, at 4 (1994) (discussing the
policy reasons for section 523).
36. Liabilities for the seduction of an unmarried female and criminal conversion also
were included in the 1903 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act. See § 17(a)(2), 30 Stat. at
544 (amended by Act of Feb. 5, 1903, Pub. L. No. 57-62, 32 Stat. 797 (1903)). For a brief
legislative history of nondischargeable debts, see 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 523 (15th
ed. 1996).
37. See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991); see also In re McKinnon, 192 B.R. 768,
771 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996).
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covered under the original exceptions to discharge that required
proof of common law notions of fraud, misrepresentation, and

willful and intentional behavior.
Examples of how the nondischargeable debt categories
expanded to include debts where no culpable conduct is required,
and where compelling public policy concerns are not apparent,
include sections 523(a)(2)(C), 523(a)(14) and 523(a)(16).38 Section
523(a)(2)(C), supported by banking and retail industry associations,
was added to section 523(a)(2) in 1984 to make cash advances and
credit card purchases of luxury goods for one thousand dollars or
more, incurred by a debtor within sixty days of filing a petition in
bankruptcy, presumptively nondischargeable. 9 Under section
523(a)(14), cash advances and credit card debts incurred by a
debtor to pay federal income taxes that would have been nondischargeable under section 523(a)(1) also are nondischargeable. °
Both of these provisions offer protection to the credit card industry
and involve no proof of intentional wrongdoing by the debtor who

38. 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2)(C), (a)(14), (a)(16) (1994).
39. Section 523(a)(2)(C) provides:
[Clonsumer debts owed to a single creditorand aggregatingmore than $1,000 for
"luxury goods or services" incurred by an individual debtor on or within 60 days
before the order for relief under this title, or cash advances aggregatingmore than
$1,000 that are extensions of consumer credit under an open end credit plan
obtained by an individual debtor on or within 60 days before the order for relief
under this title, are presumed to be nondischargeable: "luxury goods or services"
do not include goods or services reasonably acquired for the support or
maintenance of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor; an extension of consumer
credit under an open end credit plan is to be defined for purposes of this
subparagraph as it is defined in the Consumer Credit Protection Act.
Id. § 523(a)(2)(C) (emphasis added).
This provision was first added to the Code pursuant tho the Bankruptcy Amendments
and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353 (1984). It was subsequently,
amended under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 306, 108 Stat.
4107 (1994), to expand the period for nondischargeability from 40 to 60 days and to increase
the amounts from $500 to $1000. The interest groups supporting the addition of this
provision included the American Bankers Association, the Consumer Bankers Association,
and the American Retail Federation. See Oversight Hearings on Personal Bankruptcy:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary,97th Cong. 812-26 (1981-1982) (statements of A. Thomas Small, American
Bankers Association and the Consumer Bankers Association and Robert D. Ranck, the
American Retail Federation).
40. Section 523(a)(14) provides that debts "incurred to pay a tax to the United States
that would be nondischargeable pursuant to paragraph (1) [section 523(a)(1)]" are nondischargeable. This provision was added to the Code pursuant to the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1994. See § 221, 108 Stat. at 4107.
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incurred the obligation.4
Moreover, there are no compelling
public policy concerns addressed by these provisions. While it is
suggested that section 523(a)(14) "facilitates" the payment of
federal taxes through the availability of credit cards, this is only
incidental to the provision's main purpose which is to protect the
interest of the credit card industry. Similarly, section 523(a)(16)

makes all pre-petition condominium association fees or assessments
that become due post-petition nondischargeable without any
requirement that the claimant show wrongful conduct by 4the
debtor
2
and void of any compelling public policy considerations.
Examples of provisions added to section 523(a) that were
lobbied for by special interest groups and were covered by original
provisions of 523(a) to address the wrongful conduct by a debtor
are sections 523(a)(9), 523(a)(11) and (12). 43 Section 523(a)(9),
which was heavily lobbied for by Mothers Against Drunk Driving,
was added to the Code in 1984 to make debts incurred by a debtor
while legally intoxicated in the operation of a motor vehicle to be
nondischargeable. 4 Prior to the enactment of this provision,

41. The credit card industry supported this legislation, including testimony submitted in
favor of the provision from MasterCard and VISA. See Bankruptcy Reform: HearingBefore
the Subcomm. on Economic and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,103d
Cong. 520, 523-25 (1994) (statements of MasterCard International, Inc. and VISA U.S.A.
Inc.).
42. Section 523(a)(16) provides for the following to be nondischargeable:
[A] fee or assessment that becomes due and payable after the order for relief to
a membership association with respect to the debtor's interest in a dwelling unit
that has condominium ownership or in a share of a cooperative housing
corporation, but only if such fee or assessment is payable for a period during
which(A) the debtor physically occupied a dwelling unit in the condominium or
cooperative project; or
(B) the debtor rented the dwelling unit to a tenant and received payments
from the for such period.
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16). This provision was added to the Code pursuant the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1994. See § 309, 108 Stat. at 4107. It was opposed by the National
Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys for the same reasons expressed above:
NACBA opposed this provision. Historically, nondischargeability of debts has
been limited to wrongful conduct by the debtor or protection of important
governmental interests. Expansion of nondischargeability to include condominium
fees is a major change in bankruptcy policy to benefit a special interest group.
This change will erode the "fresh start" concept in bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy Reform, supra note 41 (statement of the NACBA).
43. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9), (11), (12).
44. Section 523(a)(9) provides that a debt incurred "for death or personal injury caused
by the debtor's operation of a motor vehicle if such operation was unlawful because the
debtor was intoxicated from using alcohol, a drug, or another substance" will be deemed

1998]

ARE THE COMMISSION'S RECOMMENDATIONS ENOUGH?

805

many of these debts were found nondischargeable under section
523(a)(6) as indebtedness resulting from the willful and malicious
injury of another or the property of another by the debtor.4 5
Sections 523(a)(11) and (12) were added to the Code in 1990 to
make debt judgments against the debtor due to fraud, defalcation,
or malicious or reckless conduct for operating a failed financial
institution as a fiduciary nondischargeable. 46 This kind of liability
could have been appropriately covered under section 523(a)(2), (4)
or (6) which addresses the liabilities against a debtor due to the

nondischargeable. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9).
As originally enacted under the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, this provision requires the debt owed to be in the form of a
judgment or consent decree to be nondischargeable. In 1990, section 523(a)(9) was amended
under the Criminal Victims Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647 (1990), to omit the
requirement that the debt be based on a judgment or consent decree; it expanded the
provision to include intoxication through drug use; it limited the liability to liabilities from
death or injury to the person; and it expanded the exception to discharge under chapter 13.
One of the special interest groups supporting this legislation was Mothers Against Drunk
Driving ("MADD"). See Dischargeabilityin Bankruptcy of CriminalFines, Restitution, and
Related Liabilities Arising Out of a Debtor's Operation of a Motor Vehicle While Legally
Intoxicated: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Economic and CommercialLaw of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 6 (1990) (statement of Janice Lord, National Director,
Victim Services, MADD).
45. Prior to the addition of section 523(a)(9) to the Code, the nondischargeability of
debts owed to another due to injuries caused by a debtor's operation of a motor vehicle
while intoxicated was determined under section 523(a)(6). In such cases the creditor had to
satisfy the burden of proving the debtor engaged in "willful and malicious" conduct. The
creditors' success in such actions varied depending on how the courts interpreted the "willful
and malicious" requirement. In some courts, creditors need to prove the debtor actually
intended to injure the claimant; in other courts, the creditor only needed to show the debtor
intended to engage in the conduct that caused the injury. Section 523(a)(9) was added to
eliminate this burden of proving "willful and malicious" conduct. For a discussion of the
evolution of section 523(a)(9), see Veryl V. Miles, Interpretingthe Nondischargeability of
Drunk Driving Debts Under Section 523(a)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code: A Case of Judicial
Legislation, 49 MD. L. REV. 156, 162-63 (1990).
46. Sections 523(a)(11) and (12) provide for the nondischargeability of a debt:
(11) provided in any final judgment, unreviewable order, or consent order or
decree entered in any court of the United States or of any State, issued by a
Federal depository institutions regulatory agency, or contained in any settlement
agreement entered into by the debtor, arising from any act of fraud or defalcation
while acting in a fiduciary capacity committed with respect to any depository
institution or insured credit union;
(12) for malicious or reckless failure to fulfill any commitment by the debtor to a
Federal depository institutions regulatory agency to maintain the capital of an
insured depository institution, except that this paragraph shall not extend any such
commitment which would otherwise be terminated due to any act of such agency.
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(11), (12). These provisions were added by the Crime Control Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647 (1990).
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debtor's fraudulent conduct, embezzlement, or willful and malicious
injury. This provision found its support and promotion coming
from the banking regulatory agencies that
prosecuted officers and
47
directors of failed financial institutions.
The growth in the excepted debts reflects an ever expanding
wedge separating groups of creditors and disrupts the concept of
balance in the Code's treatment of claims between creditors.
Moreover, the integrity of the system becomes more susceptible to
question as the exceptions from discharge reflect preferential
treatment of special groups of creditors as opposed to a set of
exceptions designed to preserve moral and societal norms. This
expansion of the categories of nondischargeable debts also has an
impact on the efficiency of discharge, as the courts become
increasingly burdened by having to hear more adversary claims by
creditors as categories of nondischargeable debts increased, not to
mention the confusion and perplexities caused by overlapping
provisions and the invariable need to find distinctions between
them. In essence, section 523(a) becomes a forum for special
interests, becomes increasingly distanced from the original
objectives and goals that nondischargeable debts were designed to
address, and becomes more removed from the principles of fairness
and balance that bankruptcy law was intended to embody.
As noted above, the Commission was encouraged to be "bold"
and even "adventuresome" in its mission to enhance balance and
to restore integrity to the bankruptcy system.48 One might
reasonably expect that a complete overhaul of the discharge
provisions, along the magnitude of those offered by The Bufford
Group, would be necessary to fully achieve the Commission's
mission and to rectify the adverse impact of twenty years of
"special interest law" that is so characteristic of many post-1978
amendments to section 523(a). While it is unlikely that there
would ever be a complete repeal of all of the "special interest"
nondischargeable debts under section 523(a), such a move would
be in accord with the Commission's mission. It would also reflect

47. See 136 CONG. REC. 13,288, 13,289 (1990); see also FederalEfforts to Combat Fraud,
Abuse, and Misconductin the Nation's S & L's and Banks and to Implement the Criminaland
Civil Enforcement Provisions of FIRREA: Hearings Before the Commerce, Consumer, and
Monetary Affairs Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 101st Cong.
135-36 (1990) (statements of the FDIC and Resolution Trust Corporation).
48. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (examining the original discharge exceptions).
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a return to equity and justice in bankruptcy law relief, and provide
a remedy that considers the common good of the community of
creditors and claimants affected by one individual's bankruptcy, a
kind of law that cannot exist in tandem with selected "special
interest" provisions. The Commission Report recommendations are
not so all encompassing. There are proposed changes to selected
provisions of section 523(a), several clarifications to sections 523(c)
and 727, and a recommendation that the super discharge under
section 1328(a) of Chapter 13 remain unchanged. Yet, when one
considers the volume of disagreement and debate regarding the
"abuse of bankruptcy discharge" and the controversy that the
staggering rise in consumer bankruptcy filings has precipitated, the
changes actually recommended by the Commission are quite
courageous.
Accordingly, this commentary will consider the most controversial recommendations of the Commission report concerning
discharge. In considering the individual recommendations the
discussion will include a description of (1) the recommendation; (2)
the Commissions' justification for the recommendation; (3)
comments of the Dissenting Commissioners in response to the
Commissions' Recommendations;4 9 (4) any similar or dissimilar
recommendations made by The Bufford Group; 5° (5) assess the

49. As noted, Commissioners Edith H. Jones and James I. Shepard provided a
dissenting document that was included in the Commission Report Appendix specifically
addressing the discharge recommendations. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. In this
dissent, the changes recommended by the Commission were viewed as "reveal[ing] a
noticeable shift in the present balance of law to a decidedly anti-creditor position" and that,
while the changes work toward achieving uniformity in standards applied, the cost of doing
this is too great "to creditors and to society as a whole." Because of the controversy
surrounding many of the consumer bankruptcy recommendations, it is important to include
discussion of these dissenting views. See Dissenting Commissioners, supra note 5, at 50.
50. The Bufford Group offered a more comprehensive set of suggested changes to the
discharge provisions of the Code. This set of proposed changes was made on the premise
that "exceptions to discharge should not be enacted if they deal only with discrete types of
claims faced by specific creditors and lack sufficient justification in fundamental bankruptcy
policy." In taking this approach they focused their recommendations on limiting the
nondischargeability of debts to those involving culpable conduct and debts that have a
societal benefit. Again, it is this approach that confronts the discharge concerns directly in
addressing the growing problem of preferential treatment of creditors whose debts are no
more compelling than other creditors and the adverse impact that increasing numbers of
nondischargeable debts have on the discharge of the honest but unfortunate debtor. These
recommendations were provided as a framework for the Commission's discussion of
discharge at the request of the Commission Reporter, Professor Elizabeth Warren.
Accordingly, this will provide additional insight to many of the recommendations made by
the Commission and are included in the discussion of this paper. See generally Bufford
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extent to which the Commission goals to achieve integrity,
accountability, efficiency, fairness, and balance in the bankruptcy
system can be realized through its recommendations. In addition,
because legislative proposals concerning Bankruptcy Code revision
have surfaced since the Commission began work and subsequent to
its completion, such proposals will be compared and analyzed to
the extent that they relate to questions concerning bankruptcy
discharge.5
IV. Credit Card Debts
The first recommendation of the Commission concerning
nondischargeable debts goes to the most critical issue facing
consumer debtors and the bankruptcy system, and that involves the
nondischargeability of credit card indebtedness. This recommendation provides:
Except for credit card debts that are excepted from discharge
under section 523(a)(2)(B) (for materially false written statements respecting the debtor's financial condition) and section
523(a)(14), (debts incurred to pay nondischargeable taxes to the
United States), debts incurred on a credit card issued to the
debtor that did not exceed the debtor's credit limit should be
dischargeable unless they were incurred within 30 days before
the order for relief under title 11.52
This recommendation essentially makes all credit card debts
dischargeable to the extent they do not exceed the maximum credit
card dollar limits and were incurred at least thirty days before the
filing of the petition in bankruptcy. The nondischargeability of
credit card debt would include cases (1) where the creditor is able
to offer proof that the debt should be nondischargeable based on
false written statements regarding the debtor's financial condition
under section 523(a)(2)(B) (i.e., false statements made in the credit
card application); (2) where the debt was incurred to pay nondischargeable federal taxes pursuant to section 523(a)(14); (3) where
the debt exceeds the dollar limits of the credit agreement with

Group Memorandum, supra note 6.
51. Some of the pending congressional legislation includes the following bills:
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. (1998); Responsible Borrower
Protection Bankruptcy Act, H.R. 2500, 105th Cong. (1997); Consumer Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1997, S. 1301, 105th Cong. (1997).
52. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 180.
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proof of fraud or false representations under section 523(a)(2)(A);
or (4) where the debt was incurred within thirty days of the filing
of the petition in bankruptcy. 3 The effect of this recommendation is twofold: (1) it repeals the use of 523(a)(2)(C), which makes
credit card debts presumptively nondischargeable if the debts
exceeded one thousand dollars, were incurred within sixty days of
the petition, and were for the purchase of luxury goods and
services; and (2) it virtually eliminates the use of section 523(a)(2)(A) in dealing with credit card debt purchases where a showing of
fraud and intentional misrepresentation by the debtor is required,
as well as proof of justifiable reliance by the creditor on such
representations.The Commission describes its justifications for each recommendation throughout the report. With respect to this recommendation, it was the inconsistent application of section 523(a)(2)(A) as
a means of determining the nondischargeability of credit card debts
by the courts that was the primary justification for its proposal.
Section 523(a)(2)(A) requires proof of fraud by the debtor when
In a majority of the credit card debt
the debt was incurred."
cases decided under section 523(a)(2)(A), engagement in actual
fraud was difficult to prove. Thus, many determinations of
nondischargeability under this provision were based on evidence
that did not show actual fraud.56

In discussing the problems of section 523(a)(2)(A) in determining the nondischargeability of credit card debts, it was noted that
bankruptcy courts have identified creditor abuse in using this

53. See id. at 182.
54. See id.
55. Section 523(a)(2)(A) provides that the following type of debt is nondischargeable:
[F]or money, property, services or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit,
to the extent obtained by(A) false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a
statement respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition ....
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (1994).
56. For a thorough discussion of the various interpretations and standards used by the
courts that have applied section 523(a)(2)(A) in determining the nondischargeability of credit
card debts, see COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 182-90. See also Craig A. Bruens,
Melting the Plastic Theories: Advocating the Common Law of Fraud in Credit Card
NondischargeabilityActions Under 11 U.S.C. Section 523(a)(2)(A), 50 VAND. L. REv. 1257
(1997); James M. Cain, ProvingFraud in Credit Card DischargeabilityActions: A Permanent
State of Flux, 102 COM. L.J. 233 (1997); Drew Frackowiak, The Fallacy of Conflicting
Theoriesfor Analyzing Credit Card Fraud Under 11 U.S.C. Section 523(a)(2)(A), 4 J. BANKR.
L. & PRAC. 641 (1995).
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provision by filing complaints for determinations under section
523(a)(2)(A) that were often followed by settlements and/or
reaffirmations.57 It has been the view of the courts that these
creditors have alleged fraud, and debtors responded by settling or

reaffirming the debts because of their inability to defend such
actions due to limited resources to pay for continued legal

counsel.58 The courts have expressed "concern and outrage about
these practices" and the failure of creditors to investigate the facts
to support their actions.5 9 The resulting response in some bank-

ruptcy districts has been (1) the creation of local rules that require
"hearings in settlements for pro se debtors and [to] impose
standards parallel to the reaffirmation requirements"; and (2) to

use section 523(d)6" to provide debtors a means for successful
challenges to nondischargeability claims (however, this has been
used with mixed success due to the requirement under section
523(d) that the creditor action is found not to be substantially
justified).6 1

Accordingly, the Commission recommended its thirty-day
"bright-line test" to enhance efficiency and certainty in the
determination of dischargeability of credit card indebtedness. It
was argued that this test also would reduce litigation by creditors
and protect debtors who cannot afford a defense from being prey

to creditor threats. The benefits the Commission identified in this
57. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 191-92.
58. See id.
59. Id. at 192.
60. Section 523(d) provides the following remedy to debtors successful in challenging
claims of nondischargeability under section 523(a)(2):
If a creditor requests a determination of dischargeability of a consumer debt under
subsection (a)(2) of this section, and such debt is discharged, the court shall grant
judgment in favor of the debtor for the costs of, and a reasonable attorney's fee
for, the proceeding if the court finds that the position of the creditor was not
substantially justified, except that the court shall not award such costs and fees if
special circumstances would make the award unjust.
11 U.S.C. § 523(d).
It is important to note that the Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1997, S. 1301,
105th Cong. § 202 (1997), includes a proposed amendment to section 523(d) that will allow
debtors who are successful in challenging a nondischargeability determination under section
523(a)(2) to receive attorney's fees and costs. This represents a change that will benefit
debtors because they will no longer be required to show the creditor's claim was "not
substantially justified" before receiving an award of attorney's fees and costs. Moreover,
under this proposed amendment, the debtor could receive damages in addition to attorney's
fees and costs if the debtor is able to establish that the creditor's claim was not substantially
justified.
61. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 192-93.
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test are that it is less harsh than the debtor having to settle

nondischargeability actions that are not meritorious; and it avoids
the uncertainties of a 523(a)(2)(A).6 2
While the recommendation would achieve uniformity through
a significant reduction in the use of 523(a)(2)(A) and avoid the
disparate standards of section 523 (a)(2)(A) application in determining the nondischargeability of credit card indebtedness-and a
"bright-line test" is more likely to be efficient and reduce nondischargeability of credit card debt litigation-it raises other concerns
and leaves several matters unresolved. It does not address the
availability of discharge of the credit card debt incurred by the
honest debtor who happens to make credit card charges within the
thirty-day period before the filing of the bankruptcy petition. 63
Moreover, the recommendation is a continuation of preferential
treatment of the credit card industry over other creditors in that it
makes such debts incurred within the thirty-day period absolutely
nondischargeable without regard to the debtor's conduct.
The bright-line test also does not specifically impose or require

any responsibility on the part of the lender to monitor or be
accountable for the amount of credit available to a debtor who

clearly is a credit risk.'

While there has been great discussion

62. See id. at 190-94.
63. In its discussion of the 30-day bright line test, the Commission recognized this
weakness:
The Proposal reflects the view that 30 days is the outside edge for the length of
time that this inference may be supported. Every day that the nondischargeability
period is extended, it becomes less probable that the debts were incurred in
contemplation of bankruptcy and increasingly difficult to rationalize the
preferential treatment of credit card debts over other unsecured debts. A 60-day
lookback period would have to be presumptive, which would provoke the same
litigation problems facing the current system. Even with a 30-day rule, some
debtors who have used their credit cards within the month before bankruptcy will
not have done so in contemplation of bankruptcy .... Excepting debts from
discharge based on bright line tests, such as the recommended 30 days, does not
isolate only those debts incurred with ill-intent. Therefore, this approach arguably
conflicts with discharge policy.
Id. at 195.
64. The Commission Report noted this limitation in the recommendation:
This Proposal does not affirmatively disrupt credit granting practices; unlike the
approaches taken by some courts, it does not condition creditors' relief on the
rigor of their initial scrutiny of borrowers. However, as a consequence of the
Proposal's design, the bankruptcy system would not provide an additional
safeguard for all improvident lending decisions that lenders might have addressed
themselves. As such, while credit card lenders would receive preferential
treatment over other creditors for the last 30 days of credit extended before
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about the need to educate debtors to be more responsible about

consumer debt, there also needs to be some requirement of creditor
accountability in this area.65 The question needs to be addressed

as to who should bear the risk of loss of these debts in bankruptcy,
and, more to the point, who is in the best position to avoid the
loss? Although the thirty-day rule would have the effect of making
virtually all credit card debts incurred prior to the thirty days

before the filing of the bankruptcy petition nondischargeable and,
thus, be an incentive to the credit card industry to exercise greater
scrutiny in their lending practices, the explicit imposition of some
standard of care on the part of the credit card industry should be
included in any amendment to the Code given the significance of

this kind of consumer debt in the rise of consumer bankruptcy
filings.
An obvious shortcoming with respect to this recommendation
is the fact that debtors would be able to manipulate this provision

by delaying their bankruptcy filings for thirty days after the
debtor's last use of the credit card.'

Is this thirty-day bright-line

test just another opportunity for temptation of the debtor to
manipulate the rules and exploit the obvious loophole in this

recommendation?
The Commission acknowledged many of the concerns raised
above.67
However, these concerns should not be dismissed.
Bankruptcy law does not need another provision that presents

blatant opportunity for debtor manipulation. Moreover, the
current trend of credit availability needs to be controlled in a

bankruptcy, the preference would not extend further to the creditors's earlier
lending decisions.
Id.
65. See id. at Appendix G.3 (entitled "Debtor Counseling").
66. The Commission acknowledged:
[A] bright-line nondischargeability rule might be perceived as too permissive
towards sophisticated debtors who carefully plan the timing of their bankruptcy
filings. An individual who can wait 30 days to file will avert the potential
nondischargeable status of these debts. To put this consequence in perspective,
however, that month's worth of credit debt merely would be treated like all other
unsecured debts. Credit card lenders are in a superior position to expand or limit
their risks when they determine their standards for lending unsecured debt.
Bankruptcy cannot guarantee across the board protection against losses for one
type of creditor after the fact.
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 196.
67. See supra notes 62-63, 65 and accompanying text (discussing limitations on the
Commission's recommendations).
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manner increasing the burden on creditors and their credit granting
practices.68 While the merits of the bright-line test seem to be a
solution to reducing the use of section 523(a)(2)(A) and the
potential for litigation of the nondischargeability of credit card
debts by creditors, the concerns that would remain with the
Commission's recommendations need to be addressed.

In fact,

both the comments and alternative recommendations of the
Dissenting Commissioners and the Bufford Group offer some

responses to these concerns that merit consideration if legislation
addressing the nondischargeability of credit card debt is to be
considered by Congress.
The Dissenting Commissioners raised several concerns about
the thirty-day bright-line test. While they agreed that section

523(a)(2)(A) is not an appropriate vehicle to address credit card
fraud use, they did not think that the Commission's report
identified the problem it was "trying to remedy.' 6 9 The "brightline test" was described as (1) an arbitrary rule and "totally

disingenuous" because it does not account for the "honest but
unfortunate debtor;" (2) presenting opportunity for abuse and
manipulation by debtors; and (3) encouraging a decrease in
extensions of credit to marginal borrowers, that is, while the

provision is "debtor-friendly,... it is in no way consumer-friendly." 70 The alternative recommended by the Dissenting Commis-

sioners was that (1) the time period for nondischargeability
determination be extended to cover indebtedness incurred within

sixty days prior to the filing of the petition; (2) the credit card debt
68. The Commission Report included a discussion of "Free Market Solution" to the
consumer bankruptcy dilemma which noted that:
Independent economists have been almost uniform in their conclusions that
changes to the bankruptcy laws by themselves do little to change the overall
picture of debt and credit industry losses ....
They concluded that changes in the
law to restrict access to consumer bankruptcy would have no substantial effect on
filings ....
While economists generally agree that any statutory change is unlikely
to have a significant effect on family decisions to file for bankruptcy, some have
cautioned that tightening the bankruptcy laws could have an unanticipated effect:
Two research economists have waned that new restrictions could encourage more
lending to customers who are not creditworthy ....
Changes in credit practices
may have more powerful effects. The private market can have a significant
influence on debt, default and, for some, bankruptcy ....
The solution to the
bankruptcy problem, say some market analysts, lies within the credit industry-not
in federal regulation.
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 87-88.
69. Dissenting Commissioners,supra note 5, at 60.
70. Id. at 60-61.
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would be presumed nondischargeableand it could be rebutted by the
debtor who proves that, at the time the debt was incurred, the
debtor was not contemplating bankruptcy; and (3) "that at the time
the debt was incurred a reasonably prudent person [not the debtor]
would have expected there was an ability to repay the debt."'
The recommendation by the Bufford Group addressed the
culpability element and also provided for a rebuttable presumption
of nondischargeability.72 It also addressed the need for creditors
to act responsibly and monitor credit card use.73 The reason the
Bufford Group recommended a general discharge of credit card
debts is that, for the typical debtor, the use of credit cards is not74
done with an intent not to pay but due to unwise credit choices.
Therefore, the elements for nondischargeability of credit card
debts, as recommended by the Bufford Group, would require the
credit card issuer to show that (1) it monitored the credit card use
annually (i.e., obtaining information from the debtor and a credit
card reporting service about the debtor's earnings and total
indebtedness, respectively) and (2) the debt was incurred with the
intent not to pay, with a presumption for such intent if the debt
was incurred within ninety days of the filing of the petition.75
Once this is satisfied by the creditor, the debtor would then be able
to rebut the presumption by showing that the -credit information
available revealed the debtor's inability to pay the debts and that
the credit card issuer "failed to take action necessary to avoid the
debts in question."76 To assure administration of this recommendation, the amendment would award attorney's fees for debtors
who prevail in rebutting the presumption.77

71. Id. at 63.
72. See Bufford Group Memorandum, supra note 6, at 5-6.
73. See id.
74. The group stated:
Bankruptcy relief has traditionally been available to individuals who incur credit
unwisely, undertaking larger obligations than they could reasonable have expected
to repay, and there is no reason why credit card debt should be treated differently.
Rather, unwise incurring of credit should challenge credit issuers to be more
circumspect in lending. Our conclusion is buttressed by the fact that credit card
issuers appear to promote use of the card beyond the cardholders' ability to make
prompt repayment.
Id. at 5.
75. See id. at 5-6.
76. Id.
77. See Bufford Group Memorandum, supra note 6, at 5-6. The Bufford Group also
recommended a separate provision for the nondischargeability of credit card use for
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There are some legislative proposals to amend section
523(a)(2). Both the Responsible Borrower Protection Bankruptcy
Act7" and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 199879 include proposals to amend section 523(a)(2)(C) to make "consumer debts owed
to a single creditor incurred by an individual debtor on or within
90 days before the order of relief.., presumed to be nondischargeable." Unlike the present version of section 523(a)(2)(C), which is
limited to credit card purchases of luxury goods and cash withdrawals made within sixty days before the order for relief, this proposed
amendment covers all debts incurred within the ninety days before
the order for relief. It also is not limited by a minimum dollar
amount of purchases like the current section 523(a)(2)(C) which
requires a one thousand dollar minimum of purchases made within
sixty days before the order for relief. This proposal represents
even greater preferential protection for the credit card industry.
Like the current version of section 523(a)(2)(C), it does not require
proof of actual wrongdoing by the debtor or proof that the debtor
had no intention of repaying the debt, and it does not impose any
specific requirement of accountability or responsibility on the part
of the credit card issuer in the grant of credit to the debtor.
In addition to the proposed amendment to section 523(a)(2)(C), the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998 includes proposed
amendments to subsections (a)(2)(A) and (B) of section 523. The
amendment to subsection (a)(2)(A) would omit the requirement of
the creditor providing proof of actual fraud by the debtor when
incurring a credit card debt and would replace this with a requirement that the creditor prove the debtor used the credit card
"without a reasonable expectation or ability to repay" the debt.
Subsection (a)(2)(B) would be amended to make debts incurred or
credit obtained by the debtor through false written financial
statements "without taking reasonable steps to ensure the accuracy
of the statement" nondischargeable. Again, the requirement of
proof of the debtor's fraudulent behavior or intent to deceive
would be omitted under this proposed amendment. The proposed

gambling debts. This debt would be nondischargeable where the credit card issuer shows
diligence in monitoring the debts of the debtor and if the debt was not incurred at or near
a gambling operation (the purpose of this requirement is to discourage credit card issuers
from having automatic teller machines on or near gambling operations). This nondischargeable debt also may be rebutted by the debtor. See id. at 6-7.
78. H.R. 2500, 105th Cong. § 107 (1997).
79. H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. § 142 (1998).

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 102:4

amendments are strictly pro-creditor. They remove the requirement of proof of the debtor's fraud or intent to deceive and
substitute these higher standards of wrongful conduct with lesser
requirements of proof of negligence by the debtor and objective
evidence of the debtor being unable to repay the debt at the time
incurred.
V.

Credit Card Debts Incurred to Pay Nondischargeable
Federal Tax Obligations

Section 523(a)(14) is one of the provisions that the Commission specifically recommended remain unchanged.80 This provision excepts from discharge credit card debts incurred by a debtor
for the payment of nondischargeable federal taxes under section
523(a)(1).81 The justification for this recommendation seems to be
based on the premise that this provision should be retained to
support the nondischargeability of federal taxes under section
523(a)(1) and the debtor's duty to pay taxes.'
The Commission's recommendation with regard to this
provision is counterintuitive to its goal to achieve greater balance
and integrity in bankruptcy discharge. It apparently benefits one
type of creditor, the credit card industry, and does not provide
similar benefits to other lenders of the debtor where the proceeds
of a loan to the debtor might also be applied toward the payment
of nondischargeable federal taxes. Moreover, it allows the credit
card issuer to collect on an unsecured debt without proof of
wrongdoing by the debtor during incurrence of the debt.
It is particularly worth noting that The Bufford Group
recommended section 523(a)(14) elimination because it is rarely
used and was added to "facilitate individuals' ability to use their
credit cards to pay their Federal taxes."83 They point out that the
provision, as originally enacted, presented tracing problems largely
because the federal laws did not permit use of credit cards for
direct payment of federal taxes and debtors could only make such
payments with credit card cash advances that are difficult to

80. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 196.
81. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(14) (1994).
82. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 197-98.
83. Bufford Group Memorandum, supra note 6, at 19 (quoting Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1994).
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trace.' It is further noted that the provision provides credit card
issuers with an additional means to find a debt nondischargeable
and is contrary to the premise that credit card indebtedness should
only be nondischargeable for wrongful conduct."
An additional postscript to this particular recommendation is
the proposed legislative amendments to this provision under the
Responsible Borrower Protection Bankruptcy Act and the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998.86 In these bills, it is proposed
that section 523(a)(14) be amended to make all debts incurred to
pay off any nondischargeable debt similarly nondischargeable s7
Although this proposed change would address the concern that
section 523(a)(14), as it exists, is preferential toward credit card
issuers and works against other creditors whose monies might be
used to pay a nondischargeable tax liability, the lack of any
requirement of culpable conduct by the debtor in his or her
dealings with the lender/creditor still makes its justification difficult.
VI. Criminal Restitution Orders
The Commission recommended expanding section 523(a)(13),
which makes federally imposed criminal restitution orders nondischargeable, to include all criminal restitution orders.'
This
recommendation is an attempt to clarify the law by eliminating any
unnecessary distinctions between federal and state criminal
89
restitution orders.
The response to this recommendation raises some interesting
questions about the several nondischargeability provisions that were
added to section 523(a) subsequent to its enactment in 1978. One
of the arguments against this particular recommendation is that this
is an unnecessary clarification because courts have uniformly

84. See id. Under the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34 (1997), direct
payment of federal income taxes with credit cards is now permitted and should reduce or
eliminate tracing problems.
85. See Bufford Group Memorandum, supra note 6, at 19.
86. See H.R. 2500; H.R. 3150.
87. See H.R. 2500; H.R. 3150.
88. Section 523(a)(13) provides that an obligation of the debtor for "any payment of an
order of restitution issued under title 18, United States Code is nondischargeable." 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(13) (1994). This provision was added to section 523(a) pursuant to the Violent
Crime Control and Law Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322 § 320,934 (1994).
89. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 198-99.
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applied Kelly v. Robinson,9 ° the Supreme Court decision which
found state criminal restitution orders nondischargeable under
section 523(a)(7), to also cover federal criminal restitution or-

ders.9' The opponents to this recommendation noted that section
523(a)(6) and (a)(2) can be used to except these restitution orders
from discharge and that section
523(a)(13) was essentially a
92
provisions.
these
of
duplication
This objection to a clarification of section 523(a)(13) illustrates
how many of the nondischargeability provisions added to section
523(a) since the enactment of the Code have been the result of
excessive lobbying by different groups of creditors to have
provisions enacted to address their specific claims. Section
523(a)(13) is an example of a case where the addition of a

provision was unnecessary due to the fact that the existing
provisions of sections 523(a)(6) and (a)(7) were already adequate
to address the question as to the nondischargeability of federal
criminal restitution obligations. 93 Accordingly, the addition of a

superfluous provision does nothing more than create confusion,
causing one to ponder the distinction between the new provision
and existing provisions, and is more clearly a provision that is
enacted on the behalf of a particular interest group.

What this provision, and many others that were added to
section 523(a) after 1978, seem to suggest is the need for a
legislative moratorium on additions to section 523(a). Congress
should assure more careful reflection on existing provisions of
nondischargeability and whether any proposed amendment to
section 523(a) involves conduct already covered by existing

90. 479 U.S. 36 (1986) (addressing whether section 523(a)(7) makes state criminal
restitution orders nondischargeable). The Court held that such orders were nondischargeable
under section 523(a)(7). See id.
91. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 199 n.476 (citing In re Gelb, 187 B.R. 87,
90 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing cases finding section 523(a)(7) applicable to federal
criminal restitution orders)).
92. The Commission noted that "because many restitution orders involve conduct that
gives rise to a nondischargeable debt under section 523(a)(6) for willful and malicious injury
or section 523(a)(2) for fraud, section 523(a)(13) provision duplicates the results of another
statutory section as well." Id.
93. The Bufford report follows the Commission recommendation to extend 523(a)(13)
to all criminal restitution orders. They noted, however, it may be an unnecessary recommendation due to the fact that the conduct attested by a federal criminal restitution order
is covered by section 523(a)(7) and interpreted by the case law and by the "willful and
malicious" conduct requirement under section 523(a)(6). See Bufford Group Memorandum,
supra note 6, at 19.
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provisions of section 523(a). There needs to be more careful
consideration by Congress as to whether a proposed amendment to
section 523(a) represents the kind of obligation that should be
nondischargeable, either due to a debtor's culpable conduct or due
to a compelling public policy concern. Congress must rationally
determine whether the advocates for the nondischargeability of a
particular debt represent a special interest group or the interest of
society as a whole.
VII. Family Support Obligations
The Commission also focused on the nondischargeability
provisions addressing family support obligations arising from
divorce or separation. This recommendation provides the following:
Sections 523(a)(5), (a)(15), and (a)(18) should be combined.
The revised 523(a)(5) should provide that all debts actually in
the nature of support, whether they have been denominated in
a prior court order as alimony, maintenance, support, property
settlements, or otherwise, are nondischargeable. In addition,
debts owed under state law to a state or municipality in the
94
nature of support would be nondischargeable in all chapters.
Under this recommendation, family obligations such as
alimony, child support, and property settlements in the nature of
support would continue to be nondischargeable. The goal of this
recommendation is to make the law governing the nondischargeability of support obligations and property settlements less
burdensome and less confusing and to clarify the law.95
One of the specific changes that is proposed under this
recommendation is that section 523(a)(18) be omitted. Section
523(a)(18) excepts from discharge any debt owed to a state or
municipality that is in the nature of support.9 6 The deletion of
this provision is recommended due to the fact that these obligations
are already covered under section 523(a)(5)(A). 7 Moreover,

94. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 199.
95. See id. at 200.
96. Section 523(a)(18) provides that any debt "owed under State law to a State or
municipality that is (A) in the nature of support, and (B) enforceable under part D of title
IV of the Social Security Act" is nondischargeable. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(18) (1994).
97. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 202 ("Section 523(a)(5)(A) already
excepts from discharge support obligations that were assigned to a state or political
subdivision of a state, and according to Collier on Bankruptcy, there is no legislative history
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while support obligations described under section 523(a)(5) also are
nondischargeable under chapter 13, that is not the case with
523(a)(18) debts.9" This recommended change will eliminate
redundancy between section 523(a)(5) and (a)(18) and make all of
these support obligations nondischargeable under Chapter 13 as
well.
The Commission also addressed the issue of family support
awards in community property law states.9 The Commission
noted that, in community property law states, divorce or separation
awards may not be labeled as alimony, but that such labeling does
not preclude the court from making a finding that the obligation is
in the nature of support under 523(a)(5)." ° While it was noted
that federal circuit courts have reinforced this point, and most
lower courts agree in community property states, the Commission
thought it is possible that some courts might apply different
reasoning. With this possibility in mind, the Commission recommended that section 523(a)(5) be amended to clarify that nondischargeability determinations regarding the nature of a divorcebased debt as a support award should be made in both community
property and common law states.10 1
The greater issue raised in the Commission's recommendation
surrounds section 523(a)(15). The Commission recommended that
this provision be omitted so that only property settlements that are
for support are nondischargeable 1 ° This proposed change would
no longer require courts to engage in the balancing of interests
between the debtor and the non-debtor spouse that is required
under section 523(a)(15). Section 523(a)(15) makes debts nondischargeable that are not in the nature of family support as provided
under section 523(a)(5) unless:
(A) the debtor does not have the ability to pay such debt from
income or property of the debtor not reasonably necessary to
to explain what appears to be redundant legislation.").
98. Section 1328(a) provides for the superdischarge in chapter 13 and excepts from
discharge debts under section 523(a)(5), but does not similarly make reference to debts
excepted under section 523(a)(18). See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a).
99. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 201-02.
100. The determination of whether a prepetition divorce or separation obligation is
support is to be made pursuant to federal law and not state law, allowing the bankruptcy
court to make such a determination. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 353 (1977); S.REP. No.
95-989, at 77-79 (1978).
101. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 201-02.
102. See id. at 205-06.
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be expended for the maintenance or support of the debtor or
a dependent of the debtor and, if the debtor is engaged in a
business, for the payment of expenditures necessary for the
continuation, preservation, and operation of such business; or
(B) discharging such debt would result in a benefit to the
debtor that outweighs the detrimental consequences
to a
10 3
spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor.
This provision creates a rebuttable presumption that a property
settlement obligation is nondischargeable. The debtor may rebut
the presumption by proving that: (1) he or she is unable to pay the
obligation or (2) that benefits of a discharge outweigh detriments
to the nondebtor spouse.
The Commission noted that this has been a difficult provision
to apply for courts; case law reveals the complexity and difficulty
of applying and interpreting this provision."° The Commission
report stated that the complexity of the provision weakens its
intended protection.1" 5 The Commission stated that courts, in
adjudicating questions concerning the dischargeability of divorce
based debts and in trying to decipher whether to use section
523(a)(5) or (a)(15), might tend to lean toward using section
523(a)(15) for debts labeled as support, which could then be found
dischargeable where the debtor is able to meet the burden of
rebuttal."° The Commission also noted that section 523(a)(15)
presents a timeliness issue for the creditor by requiring quick
action. The creditor must file for an adversary complaint within
sixty days of the first meeting of creditors or be precluded from
challenging the dischargeability of the debt; this debt is, in any case,
a dischargeable debt under chapter 13."
The effect of the recommendation is to change 523(a)(5) in a
way that the Commission says would make section 523(a)(15)

103. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15)(A), (B).
104. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 203-04. For a discussion of case law
interpreting section 523(a)(15), see Veryl V. Miles, The Nondischargeabilityof Divorce-Based
Debts in Bankruptcy: A Legislative Response to the HardenedHeart,60 ALB. L. REv. 1171,
1184-1204 (1997).
105. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 205.
106. See id.
107. Id. Section 523(c) of the Code requires that adversary complaints for determinations
of nondischargeability under sections 523(a)(2),(4),(6), and (15) must be made within 60 days
of the first meeting of creditors. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 4 007(c); see also 11 U.S.C. § 523(c).
Section 523(a)(15) is not one of the debts excepted from discharge under Chapter 13 section
1328(a). Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a).
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"superfluous. 1 18 The recommended provision would make all
property settlements that are not for support, without qualification,
dischargeable debts.10 9 The Commission reported that this would
eliminate the need for courts to adjudicate property settlements
under section 523(a)(15); however, they would still need to
10
determine if the award were support under section 523(a)(5).
The Commission noted, however, that there were different
views about what should be done with section 523(a)(15). Some
suggested that work should be done to clarify 523(a)(15) versus
omitting it, allowing able debtors to remain liable for nonsupport
property settlements."' Others took the view that all property
settlements should be nondischargeable-eliminating the need for
any determination as to whether a debt is in the nature of support
versus a property settlement and relieving the claimant from having
to litigate the matter at all.12 In response to this view, the
Commission stated that this assumes all property settlements have
some element of support and does not address instances where the
' 3
spouse is "better off financially than the debtor.'
The Bufford Group also recommended that 523(a)(18) be
incorporated into section 523(a)(5)." 4 They also recommended
the repeal of section 523(a)(15) based on 6 points: (1) section
(a)(15) was enacted to except debts from discharge where section
523(a)(5) had been used or applied improperly and that, if courts
applied section 523(a)(5) correctly, no support award, regardless of
the prepetition label as property settlement, would be discharged;
(2) if section 523(a)(15) is used to except support obligations that
have been labeled as property settlements, there is still no
guarantee of nondischargeability because debts falling within the
category of section 523(a)(15) are dischargeable in chapter 13; (3)
if a debt is a property settlement and not support, it should be
discharged because it is not a debt incurred due to debtor culpability, eliminating preference for a nondebtor spouse over other unse-

108. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 205.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See id. at 206. Commissioner Edith H. Jones, with John A. Gose concurring,
suggested Congress clarify the law governing 523(a)(15) to "insure that divorce-related
property settlements remain nondischargeable." Id. ch. 5, at 3 (Individual Commissioners
Views).
112. See id. at 206.
113.

COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 206.

114. See Bufford Group Memorandum, supra note 6, at 23.
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cured creditors; (4) section 523(a)(15) is not an efficient provision
due to difficulties in administration; (5) section 523(a)(15) makes
section 523(a)(5) ineffective-if judges are not sure if the debt
should be deemed support they will treat it as nonsupport and elect
to make the determination of dischargeability based on the relative
needs requirement of section 523(a)(15); and (6) section 523(a)(15)
increases intrusion into family issues that should be within the state
115
court purview.
The problem with the Commission's recommendation and the
views expressed by The Bufford Group is their failure to focus fully
Section
on the reasons for enactment of section 523(a)(15).
523(a)(15) was not enacted solely to respond to the improper use
of section 523(a)(5), but to respond to changes in domestic
relations law in terms of how divorce and separation agreements
were being drafted and to preserve the "equitable distribution
schemes" that underlie many divorce-based agreements. 116 A
very compelling assessment of the inadequacy of section 523(a)(5),
in addressing the significance of divorce-based debts in bankruptcy
this problem, was
and the role section 523(a)(15) plays in rectifying
11 7
made by the court in Dressler v. Dressier:
[T]he reality of modern divorce judgments and property
settlement agreements is that the characterization of obligations
they create is, as often as not, the product of factors not always
taken into account in section 523(a)(5) dischargeability determinations. For example, how much child support or alimony one
party receives may be a function of the extent and timing of
property division payments. One party may bargain to have an
obligation (or payment) labeled one way or the other for tax
purposes in return for some offsetting concession. Or the
parties might sign off on a form agreement without a second
thought to the way it characterizes reciprocal rights and
obligations. Divorcing couples are generally concerned with the
economic consequences of divorce, rather than the labels that
attach to the arrangement's components. For another, Congress
perceived that divorce "obligors were able to craftily draft
settlement agreements to be in property, rather than in alimony

115. See id. at 20-21.
116. See Jana B. Singer, Divorce Obligations and Bankruptcy Discharge:Rethinking the
Support/Property Distinction,30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 43, 45 (1993).
117. 194 B.R. 290 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1996).
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terms and then discharge their marital obligations in bankrupt1 18

cy.

Before section 523(a)(15) is omitted, there needs to be a clearly
stated policy determination as to whether all obligations arising
from a divorce should be preferred. If the most reasonable view
is that all and any kind of debt arising from a divorce or separation
decree should be nondischargeable, then section 523(a)(15) or some

variation of its intent needs to be preserved.
VIII. Dischargeability of Student Loans

Another recommendation by the Commission that is controversial is the repeal of section 523(a)(8) which makes guaranteed
student loan obligations nondischargeable. 119 Currently, student
loans are nondischargeable if the first installment payment was due

within seven years of the filing of the petition unless there was
undue hardship. This debt also is nondischargeable in Chapter 13

as well.12°

The question of undue hardship is very narrowly

construed against the debtor, and those who need it are usually

unable to litigate this question of undue hardship.121
The Commission Report indicated that, when the addition of

section 523(a)(8) was initially considered by the 1970 Commission
on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, there was a fear that

the educational loan borrower would try to seek bankruptcy relief
and escape liability through a bankruptcy discharge.1 22

The

118. Id. at 299-300 (citations omitted).
119. Section 523(a)(8) provides the nondischargeability of the following described student
loan obligations:
[A]n education benefit overpayment or loan made, insured or guaranteed by
governmental unit, or made under any program funded in whole or in part by a
governmental unit or nonprofit institution, or for an obligation to repay funds
received as an educational benefit, scholarship or stipend, unless(A) such loan, benefit, scholarship or stipend overpayment first became due
more than 7 years (exclusive of any applicable suspension of the repayment
period) before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(B) excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph will impose an
undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor's dependents.
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1994).
120. See id. § 1328(a).
121. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 207. For journal articles analyzing and
commenting on the "undue hardship" requirement under section 523(a)(8), see id. at 210
n.521.
122. See id. at 209 (citing the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States,
Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R. DOc. NO. 137,
Part II, at 140).
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images of abuse where largely described by the press and media. 123 Congressional members were troubled by allegations of
wild and excess abuse and did not endorse these views. Due to a
persuasive lobby, the provision was added with the enactment of
the Code in 1978. The nondischargeability of student loans was
added as an exception to the superdischarge provisions of Chapter
13 in 1990 without real evidence of abuse. 24
In making its recommendation for repeal of section 523(a)(8),
the Commission raised the question whether student loans should
be treated any differently than other consumer debts."2 It made
several findings regarding the status of student loans in the
bankruptcy process. It noted that these loans are very "overwhelming," particularly for the Chapter 13 debtor; "interest continues to
compound" during the petition; the debtor is faced with repaying
existing debts and making the student loan payments; and the
debtor emerges from bankruptcy with greater debt. 126 Moreover,
the debtor who seeks an educational loan is worse off than those
who incurred debts for other reasons in that they are discharged. 27
According to the Commission Report, empirical evidence did
not 'support the allegation that changes in "bankruptcy law
entitlements," such as the discharge of educational loans, would
affect the rate of bankruptcy filings."2 Whether debtors will
continue to file in bankruptcy and discharge student loans in
bankruptcy will not affect their decision or need to fie. Empirical
studies relied on by the Commission looked at debtors with student
loans who were in default, and these debtors were described as
having the following characteristics:

123. See id.
124. See id. at 210 (citing TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS:
BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 275 (1973) (noting that in 1981 data
indicated that less than one percent of total debt for wage earnings in all consumer cases
under chapter 13 was for educational loans)).
125. According to the Commission Report:
The question at issue in this Proposal is not whether anyone wants individuals to
discharge their debts, educational loans or otherwise. The question is whether a
debtor overloaded with consumer debts incurred to buy a car, a vacation or a
pizza can resort to bankruptcy but a debtor who borrows to pay for tuition and
books cannot.
Id. at 207.
126. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 208.
127. See id. at 208-09.
128. See id. at 213.
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[Tihey had attended vocational or trade schools; they had low
income ...; the borrowers were unemployed at the time of
default; they had borrowed small amounts; they had little or no
financial support from others; many had minority backgrounds;
some lacked high school diplomas; many did not complete the
program for which they obtained
the student loans, often
29
attending for one year or less.
There was some concern of abuse by the educational providers who
qualify for the loan programs; many of which were trade schools
and technical programs. These providers often reneged on the
service or education they promised to provide. 3 ° There was also
reference to the significant increases in tuition as schools are able
to take advantage of the availability of the nondischargeable
loans.13'

It is worth noting that this provision was the beginning of the
special interest groups finding a foothold into the Code's nondischargeable debt categories. As the legislative history revealed, at
the time the Bankruptcy Commission of 1970 looked at the
dischargeability law in 1970 and whether section 523(a)(8) was
necessary, there were critics of this kind of provision being added
and the question of special interests becoming an impetus for such
provision was raised:
Groups such as the American Bankers Association and
Consumer Bankers Association Task Forces on Bankruptcy
opposed the 1970's student loan nondischargeability litigation
that gave government agencies privileged treatment to collect
debts post bankruptcy: "If the social utility of what is exchanged
for the debt is to be determinative of dischargeability, then the
question can be raised of whether it's proper to discharge
medical bills, food bills, etc. This proposed [legislation] simply
suggests that if sufficient political pressure can be generated, a
special interest group can obtain special treatment under the
bankruptcy law.""' 2

The lack of empirical data revealing an abuse of bankruptcy
discharge with respect to student loans and Congress being

129. Id. at 215

(citing GENERAL ACCOUNTING

OFFICE, STUDENT LOANS: CHARACTERIS-

TICS OF DEFAULT BORROWER IN THE STAFFORD STUDENT LOAN PROGRAM (1991)).

130. See id. at 216.
131. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 216.
132. Id. at 210 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 595, at 150 (1977)).
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skeptical about the existence of alleged abuse at the time of

enactment is noteworthy.

Perhaps the government needed to

collect these loans more aggressively. The Commission report cited
GAO information about debt collection on student loans aid:
Delinquent student loans are harder to collect than the other
types of loans discussed in this report for several reasons. First,
unlike the housing loans, student loans are unsecured, leaving
the government and private lender with no collateral. Second,
for the loans on which Education itself is trying to collect,
delinquent cases are not received until both lenders and the
guaranty agencies have attempted collection, a process which
typically lasts at least 4 years after the debt became delinquent.
Third, it is more difficult to locate and contact borrowers who
frequently relocate after attending post secondary schools,
experience name changes in the event of marriage, and, in
general tend to have more frequent changes in residences.'33
Bankruptcy should never be or become a collection device for
lenders. The Commission identified how the lenders will likely
respond to the repeal of section 523(a)(8) once it is no longer an
available collection method:
If student loans could be discharged once again, the
government and the lenders would not be powerless to protect
themselves. If lenders request family cosigners, there is a
significant disincentive to bankruptcy filing unless both the
student and the co-signers are in financial trouble. If a child in
a wealthy family seeks to borrow money and discharge it in
bankruptcy, that child's family will remain liable on the
obligation unless the family is willing to liquidate all property
in excess of exemption and subject itself to the bankruptcy
process as well. Families with meager means may discharge the
debt in bankruptcy, but these are the families most likely to
have defaulted on the student loan even if the debt were not
dischargeable. Making more student loans nondischargeable
does not alter the defaulters' inability to repay the loans.'3'

The Dissenting Commissioners did not support this recommendation, stating that it was largely based on conclusions that the
"undue hardship exception is subject to disparate multi-factor

133. Id. at 215 n.546 (quoting GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HIGH RISK SERIES:
STUDENT FINANCIAL AID (1997) (HR-97-20SET).

134. Id. at 216.
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approaches" and that the defaults were largely from "fly-by-night
'
trade and educational schools."135
They also expressed views why
the provision should be retained: that is, section 523(a)(8) "is
necessary for the continued viability of the guaranteed student loan
program"; while the repeal of section 523(a)(8) also would
eliminate "confusion or nonuniformity" in the decisions interpreting
and applying section 523(a)(8), the Commission missed the point
in discounting all the evidence, testimony, and arguments that were
presented by various sources on how this recommendation would
adversely impact the loan program.13 6
In support of the continuation of section 523(a)(8), the
Dissenting Commissioners characterized student loans as risky loans
and important loans: risky because the borrowers do not have the
"traditional credit criteria" needed to qualify for typical consumer
loans; special because they represent an investment by the lender
in the borrower's future earnings potential due to the education the
loan would support.'37 Accordingly, these lenders need protection. It was their view that the Commission's recommendation was
more or less "an indictment of schools which do not adequately
educate or train the students than it is a justification for making
these loans nondischargeable.' 3 8 Finally, it was noted that there
is no reason for the elimination of the provision due to the fact that
there is "no public outcry" for its elimination. 39
Two recommendations regarding section 523(a)(8), offered as
alternatives, were provided by The Bufford Group."4 This report
recommended that the nondischargeability of student loans be
limited to the Health Educational Assistance Loans ("HEAL")
which is already covered by the Health Education Assistance Loan
Act. Thus, the repeal of section 523(a)(8) was recommended. The
grounds for this recommendation were that the distinction between
student loans and other unsecured loans is not merited; these debts
do not carry incidence of culpability by the debtor nor do they

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Dissenting Commissioners,supra note 5, at 52.
See id. at 52-53.
See id. at 54-55.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 58.
See Bufford Group Memorandum, supra note 6, at 14-17.
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have compelling public concerns associated with
them like the
141
taxes.
or
obligations
support
family
of
payment
The Bufford Group took a different view from the Dissenting
Commissioners regarding the purpose of these loans. The purpose
of student loans being to support education and not made as an
some investment in the earnings potential of the debtor.142 It also
was argued that any reduction in the default rate on student loans
is not due to nondischargeability of student loans but the "tightening of the programs' lending practices and the operation of shorter
'
term proprietary schools."143
They indicated there was no real
evidence that educational loan borrowers seek to discharge their
debts more than other debtors; much of the evidence revealed
these individuals have "received training of questionable value" and
are trying to overcome difficult circumstances."4 That is, defaults
are usually the result of the failure of debtors to bring about an
improvement in their earnings potential or the result of guarantors
who suspend repayment periods beyond the time stipulated under
section 523(a)(8). 45
In addition, The Bufford Group suggested that, if the repeal
of section 523(a)(8) was too much of a change and could adversely
affect the impact of such loan programs, the period for nondischargeability be reduced to five years as section 523(a)(8) was
originally enacted."4 This is suggested in light of the fact that the
default rates have dropped which, they suggest, is due to "lower
unemployment rates and more careful147monitoring of institutions
with extraordinary high default rates.1
The Commission's recommended repeal of section 523(a)(8) is
correct, and its justifications for the repeal represent sound
bankruptcy policy. If one remains true to the principles for
exception to discharge, the student loan does not merit the benefit
of an exception. As noted both by the Commission and The
Bufford Group, there is no wrongful conduct that is characteristic
of the debtor who incurs such an obligation. Moreover, there does

141. See 42 U.S.C. § 292f(g) (1994); see also Bufford Group Memorandum, supra note
6, at 14.
142. See Bufford Group Memorandum, supra note 6, at 15.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 15-16.
145. See id. at 16.
146. See id.
147. Bufford Group Memorandum, supra note 6, at 17.
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not appear to be a compelling societal need to prevent a discharge
of the debt if the available empirical evidence on the absence of
abuse is true. This exception, as indicated by the legislative history,
was a special preference granted to consumer lenders providing
student loans. The reasons for distinguishing a particular consumer
debt from other consumer debts should be measured carefully and
require extraordinary circumstances. The compelling societal
interest must be clear to all; it should be without question why the
exception is merited; and the excepted debt should, at the least,
equal the importance of other preferred obligations (such as
familial support) or support the welfare of the greater community
(such as tax debts).
IX. Retention of the Superdischarge in Chapter 13
One final recommendation by the Commission that is at the
center of controversy is the retention of the superdischarge in
Chapter 13.148 Retaining the superdischarge as it exists would
permit the chapter 13 debtor, upon completion of the plan, to
receive a discharge of all prepetition debts except debts for family
support, drunk driving, 14student
loans, criminal restitution, and
9
priority unsecured debts.
This has been a very controversial issue with several arguments in opposition to the superdischarge. For example, some
advocate "elimination of the superdischarge so that debtors are
entitled to the same discharge in any chapter."15 The Commission Report described this view as being based on public policy;
that being, the bankruptcy debtor should be subject to the same
rules governing discharge and nondischargeability of debts
regardless of the chapter of bankruptcy relief being sought. 5 1
Another argument against superdischarge relates to taxes which are
discharged under chapter 13; some advocate that taxes should not
be dischargeable under chapter 13.152 The counter argument to
this view is that the superdischarge serves debtors with a "manage-

148. "Congress should retain 11 U.S.C. section 1328(a), which permits a debtor who
completes all payments under the plan to discharge all debts provided for by the plan or
disallowed under section 502 of title 11 except for those listed in section 1328(a)(1)-(3)." Id.
at 287.
149. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1994).
150. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 288.
151. See id.
152. See id. at 289.
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able reentry to the tax system" without overwhelming liabilities
facing them at the end of the plan.'53
The Commission Report indicated that proponents of the
superdischarge noted that the superdischarge is "consistent with the
Congressional intent to build incentives" for debtors to go into
Chapter 13 and repay debts from future earnings instead of opting
for relief through Chapter 7 liquidation.'5 4 It was asserted that,
without the superdischarge, the debtor emerges from the Chapter
13 with the nondischargeable debts and an accrued interest on the
debts which, in some cases, means a greater debt facing them than
when they entered bankruptcy. 155 Another argument in support
of the superdischarge is in the fact that it eliminates the need for
litigation over whether a "particular debt was nondischargeable"
and is a direct incentive to complete the plan in order to enjoy the
benefit of the superdischarge' 56 The fact that the debts are
nondischargeable in chapter 13 protects the debtor from meritless
charges of nondischargeability and means that the monies the
debtor would have to expend on such actions could go to payment
of creditors under the plan. 57 Some proponents argue that the
superdischarge should be expanded to its original form, where the
only nondischargeable debts would be long-term debts and family
support obligations, for Chapter 13 debtors who propose repayment
plans scheduled to last at least two years longer than required
under the Code.158
The Dissenting Commissioners did not agree that the superdischarge should be retained. They criticized the Commission Report
on this issue as being too brief and simplistic. 59 They found the
Commission's assertion that the superdischarge is an incentive for
Chapter 13 filings to be disingenuous. It was specifically noted that
the Commission Report acknowledged that there was no real
evidence to support the suggestion that Chapter 13 debtors as a
whole really need the superdischarge, and, thus, this suggestion that
the superdischarge is an incentive for chapter 13 filings is not

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id.
Id.
See
See
See
See
See

COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 290.
id.
id.
id.
Dissenting Commissioners, supra note 5, at 69.
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valid. 6 ° In fact, the Dissenting Commissioners pointed out other
features of Chapter 13 relief that are greater incentives for debtors
to seek such relief including: a debtor being able to "cure defaults
on secured property to prevent foreclosures"; "the ability to strip
down liens"; and the co-debtor stay protection.1 6' Moreover, it
was the view of the Dissenting Commissioners that Chapter 13 was
a "misplaced piece of social legislation" and a "national disgrace"
in that it allows many obligations based on a debtor's wrongdoing
to be discharged while not dischargeable in Chapter 7.162
The Bufford Group recommended amending the superdischarge by excepting those debts from the superdischarge that
address "societal" needs only (i.e., alimony, support, and taxes).' 63
The recommended change would make any liability of the debtor
based on the debtor's wrongful conduct dischargeable in Chapter
13."6 They emphasized that the intent behind Chapter 13 relief
is to encourage "economic rehabilitation of the debtor who
honestly devotes all disposable income to the plan for 3 to 5 years";
in addition, while there may be debts incurred by the debtor due
to culpable conduct, the objective to bring about the economic
rehabilitation of the honest debtor should remain the primary focus
of Chapter 13 relief.165 The alternative recommendation is to
permit debtors with the nondischargeable debts to classify them
differently from other unsecured debts in order to allow a greater
reduction of such debts under the plan and lessen the burden of the
debtor coming out of bankruptcy."
Both the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998 and the Responsible
Borrower Protection Bankruptcy Act include a proposed amendment to increase the number of debts excepted from the Chapter
13 superdischarge under section 1328(a) by adding sections
523(a)(2) and (4) to the list of debts excepted from discharge;
section 523(a)(6) would be added to this list under the Bankruptcy
Reform Act proposed amendment as well.'6 7 Accordingly, the
effect of these amendments, if adopted by Congress, would be to

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

See id. at 70.
Id. at 72.
Id. at 71.
See Bufford Group Memorandum, supra note 6, at 31.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 31-32.
See H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. § 143 (1998); H.R. 2500, 105th Cong. § 104 (1997).
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make debtors remain liable for debts incurred through fraud,
embezzlement, defalcation, and willful and malicious conduct under
Chapter 13 like Chapter 7 liquidation. This increase in exceptions
to the superdischarge in Chapter 13 can be, and has been, rationalized as appropriate by those who hold fast to the view that
discharge should be available only to the debtor who comes into
bankruptcy with clean hands. However, one of the benefits and
incentives behind the Chapter 13 rehabilitation is that it allows the
debtor, who makes a good faith effort to pay prepetition indebtedness with all of his or her disposable postpetition earnings, to
receive a discharge that is more generous than that allowed in
Chapter 7. The effect of the proposed reduction to the superdischarge would lessen the attractiveness of Chapter 13 for debtors
with these types of debts. This proposal also is contrary to the
Commission's goal of making Chapter 13 rehabilitation a more
attractive alternative to the Chapter 7 liquidation.
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X. Conclusion 6 '

168. In addition to the recommendations discussed above, the Commission proposed
recommendations to clarify the law under sections 523(c) and 727. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(c),
727 (1994). Because these recommendations do not invoke the concerns about bankruptcy
policy that the recommendations affecting nondischargeable debts under sections 523(a) and
1328(a) present, the following material will briefly summarize the recommended changes and
the justification for these changes as expressed by the Commission. The recommendations
concerning section 523(c) address: (1) the application of the issue preclusion doctrine and
default judgments and (2) the application of the vicarious liability doctrines in nondischargeability determinations. The recommendations to amend section 727 concern: (1) settlements and dismissal of objections to discharge and (2) creditor remedy in instances where
there has been a lack of notice in a debtor's bankruptcy filing.
Issue PreclusionEffect on True Defaults
With respect to the doctrine of issue preclusion, the Commission recommended that
section 523(c) be amended to make it clear that issues relevant to determinations of
nondischargeability "that are not actually litigated and necessary to a prior judgement shall
not be given preclusive effect." This recommendation would require the application of an
issue preclusion doctrine, like that used in federal courts, to give the debtor the opportunity
to contest, for example, a charge of fraud as it related to a nondischargeability determination
under section 523(a)(2) where the question of fraud by the debtor had not been litigated in
a prior action. If the issue bearing on nondischargeability has been litigated before, the issue
preclusion doctrine would apply and then avoid "needless" litigation in bankruptcy court.
The Commission explained that this amendment is necessary because "not all courts
use the same test for issue preclusion," many use the issue preclusion doctrine of the state
court that decided the prior action. This is critical in bankruptcy because some state
preclusion doctrines do not require actual litigation of the issue in question. The
Commission stated that this result is inconsistent with congressional intent because
nondischargeability should be narrowly applied, and all creditors should be treated equally.
While it is appropriate to defer to prior state court judgements when the issues relevant to
dischargeability have been litigated fully, if the issue was not actually litigated, then the state
court judgment is "an insufficient basis on which to make the debt nondischargeable." The
concern with this recommendation is to prevent "force[d] entry of a default" judgment,
versus a litigated judgment, from resulting in a nondischargeability determination without any
prior litigation of the issue relevant to nondischargeability. See COMMITrEE REPORT, supra
note 1, at 217-22.
Vicarious Liability
On the matter of the appropriateness of using the doctrine of vicarious liability in
nondischargeability determinations under section 523(c), the Commission recommended that
the Code be "amended such that intentional action by a wrongdoer who is not the debtor
cannot be imputed to the debtor." The Commission noted that it was not appropriate and
contrary to Congressional intent to use the vicarious liability doctrine in determinations
under section 523(c) where wrongful conduct by the debtor is a requirement. The
Commission's belief that clarification is necessary is due to the disparity between courts in
cases where the debtor happened to be a partner or in an agency relationship with another
person who was the one engaged in misconduct. See id. at 223-25.
Effect of Lack of Notice on Time to Bring Objection to Discharge
The Commission recommended an amendment to section 727 permitting "the creditor
that did not receive notice of a bankruptcy [to receive] an extension of time to file an
objection to or seek revocation of a discharge." This recommendation would parallel the
protection of section 523(a)(3) which provides creditors whose debtors have been omitted
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The purpose of this commentary on the National Bankruptcy

Review Commission's recommendations concerning discharge has
been to consider the success of the Commission's goals. As stated

previously, the Commission attempted to present a set of proposed
changes to bankruptcy law and procedure that would improve the

integrity, accountability, and efficiency of the bankruptcy system
and to achieve fairness and balance throughout the system.
When one considers the fundamentals of bankruptcy relief and

the principal role that the discharge plays in this relief, the stated
goals of the Commission to bring about such a holistic reform is
undaunting. This is particularly true when one considers how the
basic rules of discharge, and specifically the exceptions to discharge,
have become blurred and grossly distorted by the special interest
group legislation that has permeated the nondischargeability
provisions of section 523(a) during the last twenty years since the
enactment of the Bankruptcy Code. The original principles for
debt exception from discharge have been set aside time and time
again. All too often, neither the requirement of debtor wrongdoing
nor compelling societal nor moral justification for nondischarge-

ability were required for nondischargeability status for many of the
from bankruptcy schedules the possibility of having the debt deemed nondischargeable. As
the Commission Report noted, generally, the remedy for creditors to have discharge denied
under section 727 has been to seek an extension within the time permitted under Bankruptcy
Rule 4004(b) or seek a revocation of discharge under 727(e). Unfortunately the language
of these provisions do not precisely address this situation. While the Commission recognized
these alternatives for relief under the Code, it suggested this amendment to "encourage
debtors and their attorneys to be as forthright as possible in listing creditors and in providing
accurate information." See id. at 227-28.
Settlement and Dismissal of Objections to Discharge
The Commission recommended an amendment to section 727 to require in any motion
by a creditor to dismiss a complaint against discharge that all other creditors should be
notified advising them that they have an opportunity to substitute themselves in the
complaint; an affidavit disclosing all consideration that the debtor is giving the creditor in
connection with the dismissal; and, if consideration is given by the debtor, it must be a
benefit to the estate.
The purpose of this recommendation is to address the problem with creditors objecting
to discharge with the purpose of extracting a reaffirmation from the debtor, or other benefits
for a creditor, which may indicate a "meritless" complaint or any "undeserving debtor" who
is trying to prevent other creditors from discovering dishonesty. This recommendation also
reflects a local practice in some bankruptcy courts where they treat the creditor filing the
complaint as a "trustee" for all creditors and prohibit the creditor from "abdicat[ing] that
responsibility or us[ing] that position" to his own benefit. The Commission noted that not
all dismissals are deceptive, but this requirement is designed to give bankruptcy courts
information to determine if dismissal or settlement should be approved or to permit other
creditors to be substitutes. See id. at 228-31.
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post-1978 amendments to section 523(a), as was the case with the
enactment of section 523(a)(2)(C), (a)(8), (a)(14), and (a)(16). Or,
in other instances, a new exception to discharge, specially tailored
to accommodate special interest group obligation, was added to
section 523(a) when original provisions under section 523(a)
covering basic common law notions of intentional wrongful conduct
by the debtor were sufficient and appropriate in requiring creditor
proof of fraud, embezzlement, or willful and malicious injury where
appropriate-such as in the case of section 523(a)(9), (11)-(13). All
of which has resulted in unnecessary duplication in the law and a
bloated body of nondischargeable debt categories.
Given the fact that the number of nondischargeable debt
categories increased from eight to eighteen since 1978, the
Commission's selective and limited set of recommendations is to be
commended. While this commentator would have preferred an
overhaul of the discharge provisions, similar to the "take-the-bullby-the-horn" approach of The Bufford Group, the Commission did
make movement toward a restoration of integrity, fairness, and
balance in several of its recommendations. In particular, it was
willing to take on the issue of credit card debt and student loan
exceptions to discharge which alone is quite controversial given the
powerful lobby of the consumer credit industry.
It is obvious that the Commission's recommendations go
against the tide by virtue of the fact that the pending consumer
bankruptcy legislation from both the House and Senate offer very
little in terms of reform of nondischargeable debt categories and,
instead, provide greater protections to credit card issuers and
ignore the need to restore the fairness and balance that the basic
principles for discharge and exception to discharge embody; that is,
to provide discharge to the honest debtor and to assure that
creditors are treated equitably. The continuation of preferential
treatment of selected groups of creditors in the discharge can only
be justified in cases where the debtor is undeserving due to
wrongful or culpable conduct in dealing with a particular claimant,
or where our most valued moral and societal obligations make a
discharge of such debts detrimental to the welfare and basic fabric
of society.
As a law premised in equity, bankruptcy law must be about
fairness and balance for the good of all parties affected by the
debtor's bankruptcy. To the extent that the exceptions to discharge
are contrary to basic notions of fairness and balance, there should
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be reform. The Commission's recommendations are a big step in
this direction.

